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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the housing market of the United States is a "$13 trillion
residential mortgage market," which "depends directly on clarity of
mortgage title[.]" 2 On October 31, 2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio
decided Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald and
jeopardized the integrity of that market, and titles to hundreds, perhaps
3
thousands, of properties in Ohio.
Schwartzwald, like all cases, has a story.

In 2006, the

2 Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization,Foreclosure,and the Uncertaintyof Mortgage
Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 645 (2013).
3 See generally Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2012).
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Schwartzwalds purchased property in Xenia, Ohio.4 At that time, the
Schwartzwalds also executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage with
Legacy Mortgage.5 Eventually, they defaulted on the promissory note,
which had been assigned to Wells Fargo, the loan servicer. 6 And in April of
2009, Freddie Mac filed a complaint for foreclosure, without receiving
assignment of the note until May of 2009.' The Ohio Second District Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of Freddie Mac on summary judgment.8 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second District Court's decision, and
dismissed Freddie Mac's complaint for lack of standing, since Freddie Mac
did not receive the assignment until after it filed the complaint. 9 The
foreclosure judgment was, therefore, void.l1
Because the foreclosure judgment was voided, rather than the Court
upholding the foreclosure judgment and applying the decision prospectively,
the decision has retroactive effect, potentially rendering null and void all
foreclosure judgments, which lacked assignment of the note prior to the
complaint." Therefore, in Ohio, all foreclosures, where the note has been
assigned, 2 can be questioned as to their validity, which has a huge impact
on people who have purchased foreclosed upon property. This will result in
a parade of horribles.
In addition to creating adverse economic impacts, which are beyond
the scope of this Comment, the Schwartzwald decision may cause mortgage
lenders to further urban blight by walking away from properties, title
insurance companies to create gaps in coverage on foreclosed properties,
and bona fide purchasers to face a list of hurdles. Bona fide purchasers
could possibly (1) incur the costs of litigation in fighting for good title to
their property, likely through quiet title actions; (2) be forced to lose a loan
after otherwise completing the closing process; and (3) lose value in their
property by being stuck with unsellable property. Furthermore, foreclosed
upon parties may be given a second bite at the apple, creating judicial
inefficiencies. There are also severe economic impacts of the decision,
which are beyond the scope of this Comment. Identity of ownership
through clarity of title belongs to both sellers and buyers of property, and
4 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 793-97 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011),
rev'd 979 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2012).
' Id. at 793.
6

Id.

7 Id. at 793-94.

8 Id. at 805; see also Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1216.
9 Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1216.
10 Id.
1

See id.

Title agents will have to look for a foreclosure in the chain of title, and then check to see if there
was an assignment of the note. If there was an assignment of the note then the title agent will have to see
if that assignment was dated prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint. If it was, a Schwartzwald
issue does not exist. If it was not, validity is called into question, and the foreclosure judgment is likely
void. •
12
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the Court takes that away from both.
The implications of Schwartzwald will, thus, change the landscape
of both past and future foreclosures in Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court
failed to see the impacts of its decision, especially as its holding pertains to
bona fide purchasers. Consequently, the Court should readdress the issue
and reverse itself.
The Ohio Supreme Court should overrule or reverse its decision in
Schwartzwald because the holding goes against the well-established
precedent concerning the long recognized rights of bona fide purchasers as
well as the commonly held practices in the mortgage lending industry and
the title insurance industry. The decision jeopardizes property owners'
rights and threatens industries that are part of a major sector of the economy
in Ohio and the United States as a whole - the residential mortgage industry.
In addition, the Court's holding is fundamentally flawed in two
ways. First, it equates a lack of standing issue with a subject matter
jurisdiction issue, which is disputed by other Ohio decisions. 3 Second,
even if the Court wants to equate lack of standing to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court did not go far enough in its decision, instead putting
bona fide purchasers in a position where they are no longer treated as bona
fide purchasers.
This Comment will first discuss important terminology in Part II.
Also in Part II is a discussion of the background of the foreclosure landscape
prior to Schwartzwald, specifically the split in the district courts in Ohio on
how to address the issue of standing in a foreclosure action. To better frame
the discussion in Part III, Part II will also give a more in depth analysis of
the facts of Schwartzwald. Finally, Part II will also address the Ohio
Supreme Court's inconsistent application of real party in interest precedent
and standing precedent in Schwartzwald, State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, and in
Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education v. Franklin City
Boardof Revision.
Part III of this Comment will discuss the effects of the
Schwartzwald decision on the foreclosure process. This part of the
Comment will explicate which parties are affected by the decision, those
"3 Compare Self Help Ventures Fund v. Jones, No. 2012-A-0014, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 767, at
*4-9 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2013), Lasalle Bank Nat'l. Ass'n. v. Street, No. 08 CA 60, 2009 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1560, at *10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2009), Wachovia Bank v. Cipriano, No. 09CA007,
2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4605, at *9-14 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13 2009), and Bank of N.Y. v. Stuart, No.
06CA008953, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1387, at *5-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007), with Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 881, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009),
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722, 724-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). See also
Groveport Madison Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 998 N.E.2d 1132, 1139
(Ohio 2013); State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ohio 1998); John B. Leach, Taking a
Stand on Standing: The Real Party in Interest Conflict in Ohio ForeclosureActions, 40 CAP. U.L. REV.
1099, 1119-24 (2012).
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specifically being: (1) the mortgage lending industry; (2) the title insurance
industry; (3) the third party purchasers (typically, bona fide purchasers) of
foreclosed upon homes; (4) the courts; and (5) the foreclosed upon parties.
Further, Part III of this Comment will provide alternative holdings
that should have come from Schwartzwald. If the Court had not held a lack
of standing to be a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the holding would
have been proper, pursuant to and supported by Ohio law. In the alternative,
the Court should have required prospective application of the decision so as
to provide time for the mortgage lending industry and title insurance
industry to react, and should have limited the decision to avoid inequitable
outcomes for innocent bona fide purchasers.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the Schwartzwald decision, there was a split in Ohio as to
whether (1) a party could cure standing in a foreclosure action by
assignment of the mortgage and promissory note prior to final judgment;
and (2) whether the lack of standing should be equated to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.14 Consequently, this prior case law is important to
discuss and understand in light of the Schwartzwald decision.
It is also important to discuss the relevant terminology as it relates
to the split in the district courts in Ohio and as it relates to the subsequent
decision from the Ohio Supreme Court in Schwartzwald. As such, the
background section of this Comment will begin by discussing the interplay
between the definition of standing and real party in interest and the interplay
between subject matter jurisdiction and void versus voidable judgments
because it is paramount to the discussion of Schwartzwald and its effects. It
is also important to briefly discuss bona fide purchasers to provide a
framework for who exactly is affected by the Schwartzwald decision.
This section will also review the facts of Schwartzwald more in
depth. Finally, it is important to address the Ohio Supreme Court's
inconsistent application of real party in interest and standing precedent in
Schwartzwald, Suster, and Groveport. This will help to frame the issues to
be analyzed in Part III of this Comment.
A. The InterplayBetween Standing andReal Party in Interest
In order for a controversy to be justiciable, a party must have

" Compare Jones, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 767, at *4-9, Street, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1560, at
*10-11, Cipriano,2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4605, at *9-14, and Stuart, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1387, at
*5-8, with Jordan, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 881, at *12, and Byrd, 897 N.E.2d at 724-5. See also Leach,
supranote 13, at 1119-24.
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standing to sue.15 The Ohio Supreme Court stated that, "standing depends
on whether the party has alleged a 'personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.""' 6 This requirement and definition of standing has been cited
all the way up to the United States Supreme Court.'7
In Ohio, "[c]ommon-law standing is similar to Civ.R. 17(A)'s realparty-in-interest requirement."1 8 A real party in interest is "'one who has a
real interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and not merely an interest
in the action itself, i.e., one who is directly benefitted or injured by the
outcome of the case.""' 9 If a party has standing as a real party in interest and
there is an otherwise justiciable controversy, "[t]he courts of common pleas
and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers
and agencies as may be provided by law."2
Although it has been held in other states, and even by the United
States Supreme Court, that standing should be determined "as of the
commencement of the suit,"'" it is held that in Ohio, "the issue of standing,
inasmuch as it is jurisdictional in nature, may be raised at any time during
the pendency of the proceedings."22 Further, according to Ohio Civil
Procedure Rule 17, standing may not be jurisdictional insomuch as it states
that:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
15 Cleveland v. Shaker Heights, 507 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Ohio 1987); see also OHIO CONST. art. IV, §
4(B); ROBERT M. CURRY & JAMES GEOFFREY DURHAM, OHIO REAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 19.05[l] (6th ed. 2013).
16 Cleveland, 507 N.E.2d at 325 (quoting Middletown v. Ferguson, 495 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Ohio
1986)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009) (defining standing
as "[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right").
17 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) ("Standing to sue is part of the
common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case." (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990))).
"8 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 802 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011),
rev'd 979 N.E.2d 1214 (2012).
11 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Swayne, No. 2009 CA 65, 2010 WL 3292363, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 20, 2010) (quoting Shealy v. Campbell, 485 N.E.2d 701, 702 (Ohio 1985); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1232 (defining a real party in interest as "[a] person entitled under
the substantive law to enforce the right sued upon and who generally, but not necessarily, benefits from
the action's final outcome").
20 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B); see also Levitin, supra note 2, at 643-44 ("[T]here is broad
agreement among courts that some sort of standing or similar status is necessary for both judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure . . . . There is far less agreement, however, about what determines who has
standing to bring the foreclosure.").
21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n.5 (1992).
22 New Boston Coke Corp. v. Tyler, 513 N.E.2d 302, 305 (Ohio 1987).
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action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
23
interest.
Furthermore, Section 1303.31(A) of the Ohio Revised Code
"identifies three classes of persons who are 'entitled to enforce' an
instrument, such as a note"; those are: "(1) the holder of the instrument; (2)
a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder;
and (3) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to
24
enforce the instrument pursuant to R.C. 1303.38 or R.C. 1303.58(D).,
The Fifth District Court of Appeals for Ohio has also held that,
where there is a transfer of a note, a transfer of the mortgage will be implied
as long as there is intent to transfer both, suggesting that an assignment of
the note post-commencement of the suit will suffice to cure any lack of
standing due to the intent in assigning the mortgage. 25 However, a
discussion about intent to transfer in the context of Schwartzwald and how
exactly Freddie Mac came into possession of the note is outside the scope of
this Comment.
B. The Interplay Between Subject MatterJurisdictionand Void Versus
Voidable Judgments
The definition of subject matter jurisdiction, particularly the
distinction between lack of jurisdiction and improper exercise of
jurisdiction, controls whether a foreclosure judgment would be considered
void or voidable.26 There is a specific difference between lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and improper exercise of jurisdiction over a claim. 27 A
court has subject matter jurisdiction when it has jurisdiction over the issue
or nature of the case and relief sought, such that it can rule on the conduct of
the parties or the state of things in the case.2" The Second District Court of
Appeals for Ohio noted that, "[j]urisdiction over a particular case is an
elusive concept, defined best by example."29 It went on to give such an
example:
A common pleas court is a court of general jurisdiction and
has subject matter jurisdiction over crimes committed by an
adult. Nevertheless, where the common pleas court fails to
strictly comply with procedures in a capital case, such as the
23 OHIO R. Civ. P. 17(A).
24 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)
(referencing Ohio Revised Code Section 1303.31 (A)), rev'd 979 N.E.2d 1214 (2012).
2' Bank of New York v. Dobbs, No. 2009-CA-000002, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4019, at *28-29
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009) (discussing Section 5.4 of the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Mortgages).
26 Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d at 803.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 931.
29 Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d at 803 (citation omitted).
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failure to utilize a statutorily mandated three judge panel, it
is an improper exercise of jurisdiction over the case.3 °
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, unlike other
affirmative defenses, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a
judgment void.3' Other authority in Ohio, from the Ohio Supreme Court,
has held that a lack of standing issue does not challenge the court's subject
matter jurisdiction but, rather, challenges the ability of the complaining
party to bring the action at all.32
Furthermore, depending on the jurisdictional question, the
foreclosure actions become either void or voidable.33 The Ohio Supreme
Court explicated the distinction, generally, between void and voidable
actions in Miller v. Nelson-Miller:
The distinction is between the lack of power or want of
jurisdiction in the Court, and a wrongful or defective
execution of power. In the first instance all acts of the Court
not having jurisdiction or power are void, in the latter
voidable only. A Court then, may act, first, without power
or jurisdiction; second, having power or jurisdiction, may
exercise it wrongfully; or third, irregularly. In the first
instance, the act or judgment of the Court is wholly void,
and is as though it had not been done. The second is wrong
and must be reversed upon error. The third is irregular, and
must be corrected by motion. Thus, a judgment is generally
void only when the court rendering the judgment lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties;
however, a voidable judgment is one rendered by a court
that lacks jurisdiction over the particular case due to error or
irregularity.34
In Pratts v. Hurley, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that subject matter
jurisdiction "is a 'condition precedent to the court's ability to hear the case.
If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is
void. "'I'
Further, as explicated in the Second District Court of Appeals
30 Id.
"' Id.; see also State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ohio 1998) (citation omitted).
32 Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1008 (citation omitted) ("Lack of standing challenges the capacity of a
party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.").
"3 Miller v. Nelson-Miller, 972 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ohio 2012) (citing Cochran's Heirs v. Loring, 17
Ohio 409, 423 (1848)).
14 Id. at 571 (citations omitted); see also GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, LAND
TRANSACTIONS AND FINANCE 165 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that, in the context of deeds, "[i]f the grantee
has reconveyed the land to a BFP, a void deed will be set aside even as against the BFP, while a merely
voidable deed will not").
" Pratts v. Hurley, 806 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ohio 2004) (quoting Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1007).
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decision in Schwartzwald, there is a parade of horribles to consider if lack of
standing is equated to lack of subject matter jurisdiction:
If there is no jurisdiction in the court, then the judgment is
void and can be challenged at any time. One could
speculate on the effect of a holding that any judgment and
decree of foreclosure ever granted wherein it can be shown
that a mortgagee did not, at the time of the initial complaint,
have standing and thus was not a real party in interest,
results in the court's not having jurisdiction.36
Therefore, as a result of Schwartzwald's interpretation of
jurisdiction, foreclosure judgments made without jurisdiction - because the
foreclosing party did not receive assignment of the note prior to filing a
complaint - are void.
C. Bona Fide PurchaserTerminology
The third parties that purchase foreclosures after judgment of the
court can be considered bona fide purchasers, as long as they meet the
requirements of such. Ohio courts have defined a bona fide purchaser "as
one who takes in good faith, for value, and without actual or constructive
notice."37 According to the Ohio Supreme Court, "[p]ursuant to [Ohio
Revised Code Section 5301.25(A)], a bona fide purchaser for value is bound
by an encumbrance upon land only if he has constructive or actual
knowledge of the encumbrance."38
If a bona fide purchaser has no knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of an instrument recorded against the bona fide purchaser's
title, the bona fide purchaser's title is not affected by that instrument, which
demonstrates the legal protection afforded to a bona fide purchaser for value

36 Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d at 803.
" Biviano v. Edward C. Mahan Trust, No. 2002-T-0089, 2003 WL 22931350, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 12, 2003) (citing Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. of Wooster v. Yarborough, 228 N.E.2d 841, 846 (1967);
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1355 (defining a bona fide purchaser as "[o]ne
who buys something for value without notice of another's claim to the property and without actual or
constructive notice of any defects in or infirmities, claims, or equities against the seller's title; one who
has in good faith paid valuable consideration for property without notice of prior adverse claims"); Bona
Fide PurchaserDefinition, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/bona-fide-purchaser/ (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (defining a bona fide purchaser as, "[a] purchaser for a valuable consideration paid
or parted with in the belief that the vendor had a right to sell, and without any suspicious circumstances
to put him on inquiry") (citation omitted).
38 Emrick v. Multicon Builders, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (Ohio 1991); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5301.25(A) (West 2014); GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE,
AND DEVELOPMENT 213 (8th ed. 2009) ("BFP status encompasses two elements: paying value and
lacking notice of the prior conveyance."); Bona Fide Purchaserfor Value Without Notice Definition, THE
LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.orgfbona-fide-purchaser-for-value-without-notice/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015) (defining a bona fide purchaser for value without notice as, "party that buys property
without any idea of prior claims on it. They are not liable for prior claims unless it was registered before
the purchase").
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without notice.39 Further, a mortgage that is unrecorded is unenforceable

against a bona fide purchaser who has no knowledge of it.40 This suggests
that if a foreclosure judgment is voided, the mortgage is still in effect, or it
becomes effective again. The question is whether that mortgage is
considered unrecorded as against the bona fide purchaser who purchased the
property after the mortgage had already been released as a result of the
foreclosure judgment. 41 The effects of the answer to that question are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
D. The DistrictSplit in Curing StandingIssues
Although outside the scope of this Comment, it is interesting to note
as a perspective point that there have been nearly three thousand reported
opinions concerning this type of standing issue within the last five years. 2
For the purposes of this Comment it is important to discuss that, prior to the
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Schwartzwald, there was a split in
the district courts as to how the issue of standing could or could not be cured
in a foreclosure action.43 Specifically, the First and Eighth Districts had
"held that a lack of standing cannot be cured by substituting the real party in
interest for an original party pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A)."' Essentially, these
districts required that the assignment be made prior to the complaint ever
being filed, otherwise there would be a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4 5
Other district courts were holding the opposite prior to
Schwartzwald, that "[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, the lack of standing
or a real party in interest defect can be cured by the assignment of the
mortgage prior to judgment. '46 Schwartzwald's holding mimicked the First
3 Four Howards, Ltd. v. J & F Wenz Rd. iv., LLC, 902 N.E.2d 63, 72 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
40 Vickroy v. Vickroy, 542 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
41 The chain of title would show a release of the mortgage, thus, giving a "false" impression of clear
title. The impression is false because the mortgage would be effectively reinstated due to the void
judgment.
42 Levitin, supra note 2, at 642. Furthermore, the Schwartzwald decision has been cited over 192
times as of the last update of this Comment. However, for purposes of avoiding redundancy and with
respect to the Law Review Staff Writers who will work tirelessly on my Comment, this author will not
cite the 192 cases. This author would suggest that the reason for the prevalence of this issue is the 2008
mortgage lending crisis and the market crash discussed infra at Part H (E).
4" Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1217-18 (Ohio 2012); see
also CuRRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 19.05[1]. But see Levitin, supra note 2, at 641 (explaining
that the reason for the confusion of the law arose out of the too-big-to-fail housing finance industry
changing and disregarding prior law because it was inconvenient, "banking on its too-big-to-fail status to
guarantee favorable legal outcomes").
4 Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1217. See also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009
WL 625560, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722,
726 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2008); see also Levitin, supranote 2, at 642 ("There have been nearly three
thousand reported opinions dealing with this issue [of standing] in some way over the past five years
[nationwide].").
4 Jordan,2009 WL 625560, at *4; Byrd, 897 N.E.2d at 726.
6 Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1216; Lasalle Bank Nat'l. Ass'n. v. Street, No. 08 CA 60, 2009
Ohio App. LEXIS 1560, at *10- 11 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2009); Wachovia Bank v. Cipriano, No.
09CA007, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4605, at *11-14 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13 2009); Bank of N.Y. v.
Stuart, No. 06CA008953, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1387, at *5-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007). The
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and Eighth Districts' decisions - a minority of the split in districts and
reasoning that, "standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction
therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint."47
E. ResidentialHousing Market Crash Background
In 2008, the residential housing market faced arguably its most
troubling time.48 Ultimately, "the residential mortgage market ...collapsed
."..The crash was "accompanied by drastically reduced liquidity, the
de-privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . .and the failure of a
number of other large investment bankers and institutional lenders."5
The crash was caused primarily by two factors.51 First, in 2001,
interest rates were the lowest they had been throughout the entire Twentieth
Century. 52 The second factor was the "fundamental structural realignment
in the mortgage lending industry., 53 Beginning in the 1970's, the mortgage
lenders sold their loans on the secondary mortgage market to investors such
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who required high standards to ensure
borrowers were in positions to pay back their loans.5 4 By the beginning of
the Twenty-First Century, more independent brokers emerged on the scene
and sold many of the loans on the market.5 5 These independent brokers
were encouraging borrowers to get "creative" with their answers on their
loan applications to show ability to repay." As a result, borrowers became
"stuck" in loans they could not afford and houses they could not sell because
the market did not support the sales.57 In other words, borrowers could not
sell their homes to cover their indebtedness, but yet, they could not afford
their loans and thus, many of them fell into foreclosure.
The low interest rates and downed home values were directly to
Also directly to blame were "mortgage brokers, wholesale
blame.
lenders/securities issuers, and securities investors."58 The parties affected
were very widespread from pension fund investors, to commercial banks
and insurance companies, to the individuals who purchased the mortgages.5
author of this Comment would submit this holding is the proper one because it does not alter the results
of the judgment to allow curing by assignment during the adjudication process. Further, this holding
creates more judicial efficiency.
47 Schwartzwald,979 N.E.2d at 1216.
48

See NELSON ET AL., supranote 38, at 486,

49

id.

50 Id.
51 Id.
52 id.

" Id. at 487.
54 id.

55 Id.
56 id.
17 Id. at 488.
58

See id.

'9 Id. at 489-90.
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This market crash led right up and into Schwartzwald and its facts.
F. Schwartzwald Background
In Schwartzwald, the Ohio Supreme Court cured the district split,
but created something worse. 60 The complete background of Schwartzwald
lays the foundation for the rest of this Comment. In 2006, Duane and Julie
Schwartzwald purchased property in Xenia, Ohio, and executed a note for
$251,250.00 secured by a mortgage on the property.61 Legacy Mortgage
held both the original mortgage and the original promissory note.62 By
2009, the Schwartzwalds were unable to make their loan payments and
began a short sale process 63 with Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo had acquired the
promissory note and mortgage from Legacy Mortgage in November of
6 Wells Fargo
2006.A
assigned the promissory note and mortgage to Freddie
Mac in May of 2009.65 Freddie Mac filed a foreclosure action in April of
2009, prior to the date the short sale was set to close.66 This was also one
month prior to receiving the assignment from Wells Fargo in May of 2009.67
Freddie Mac, however, alleged that it owned the promissory note, but did
not attach a copy of the promissory note to its complaint.6 8
After the complaint had been filed, however, Wells Fargo assigned
the note to Freddie Mac. 69 After Freddie Mac filed the complaint for the
foreclosure action, Wells Fargo declined to move forward with the short sale
process.70 It was not until December of 2009, nine months after it brought
suit, that Freddie Mac filed copies of the November 2006 assignment from
Legacy Mortgage to Wells Fargo and the May 2009 assignment from Wells
Fargo to Freddie Mac. 7'
Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment was granted, while

60 See generally Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2012)

61 Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), rev d 979 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2012).
62 id.

63 A short sale is a "reasonable alternative to foreclosure." Zachary T. Brumfield, The "Short Cut"
to the Stabilization of the Underwater Housing Market: How the New FHFA Short Sale Guidelines
PromoteEconomic Efficiency, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 456, 457 (2013). In a short sale, the "senior and junior
lien holders release their liens on the property in order to obtain a contracted amount of proceeds from
the sale." Id. When compared to a foreclosure, "a short sale provides, on average, a larger recovery for
lien holders and a smaller deficiency for borrowers." Id. "Short sales typically sell the property at only a
10% discount where a foreclosure sale generally s[ell] at a 30% discount of the actual fair market value."
Id. Consequently, a short sale is an attractive alternative to foreclosure, as "a short sale is an efficient
alternative to the foreclosure process as long as the parties are able to come to an agreement on the
details and price during a short sale negotiation." Id.
64 Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d at 793-95.
65 Id. at 794.

66 Id at 793.

67 Id. at 794.
68 Id. at 794.
69

Id.

70 Id. at 793-95.
71 Id. at 793, 795.
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the Schwartzwalds' motion for summary judgment was denied.7" The
Schwartzwalds appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeals "held
that Federal Home Loan had established its right to enforce the promissory
note as a nonholder in possession, because assignment of the mortgage
effected a transfer of the note it secured."73 The Ohio Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeals, and held that,
since Freddie Mac did not hold the promissory note prior to filing the
complaint, it lacked standing, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter
The Court
jurisdiction, rendering the foreclosure judgment void.74
dismissed Freddie Mac's complaint without prejudice, voiding the
foreclosure judgment.75 As a side note, had an assignment never occurred,
the judgment would definitely be void; but here, the assignment was made
prior to the Court's judgment on the foreclosure.76
G. The Ohio Supreme Court'sInconsistentApplication of Real Party in
Interest and Standing
The proper precedent for standing and the substitution of real parties
in interest is Suster, which the Schwartzwald Court should have followed.77
In Suster, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a substitution for a real party in
interest could be made to cure a lack of standing or subject matter
jurisdiction.78 This case did not pertain to real estate or foreclosures7 9 and
therefore, does not affect the issue of curing standing that caused the
aforementioned split in the district court decisions." However, the decision
72 Id. at 796.
7' Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ohio 2012).

7" Id. at 1216; see also 3 COUSE'S OHIo FORM BOOK § 39.10 (6th ed. 2014) ("A future assignee of a
promissory note and mortgage that does not have an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it files a
foreclosure action has no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and the lack of
standing is not cured by an assignment to plaintiff of the note and mortgage prior to entry of summary
judgment in its favor. A litigant cannot cure a lack of standing after commencement of the action by
obtaining an interest in the subject of the litigation and substituting itself as the real party in interest."
(citing Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1220)).
75 Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d at 1223. Since the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, the
whole process could start all over leading to judicial inefficiency discussed infra at Part III (C)(1).
76 See Schwartzwald, 957 N.E.2d at 793-97.
77 State ex rel.Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ohio 1998).
71 Id. ("The lack of standing may be cured by substituting the proper party so that a court otherwise
having subject matter jurisdiction may proceed to adjudicate the matter." (citing OHIO R. Civ. P. 17)).
To be clear, there is no question that the Schwartzwald courts otherwise had subject matter jurisdiction.
71 Id. The petition in this case was filed by the prosecuting attorney from Cuyahoga County after
the infamous conviction, and subsequent acquittal, of Dr. Samuel Sheppard in the murder of his pregnant
wife, Marilyn Sheppard. Id. at 1004. In the original case, Dr. Sheppard was convicted and sentenced to
life in prison, but after ten years in prison, he was granted a new trial by the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio on the basis that he did not receive a fair trial in the first instance. Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 231 F.Supp. 37, 40, 72 (S.D. Ohio 1964). That decision was reversed on appeal by the Sixth
Circuit, but then the Sixth Circuit's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966). "Upon retrial, [Dr.] Sheppard was found not guilty. He
was discharged from prison in 1966." Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1004. The special administrator for
Sheppard's estate, after Sheppard died in 1970, filed a "Petition for Declaration of Innocence as a
Wrongfully Imprisoned Individual" ultimately leading to Suster. Id.
80 Ultimately, Suster could be distinguished as to subject matter, but not as to procedure.
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was very clear that the substitution of real parties in interest, when there is a
lack of standing, was perfectly acceptable even after the complaint was
filed. The Court in Suster further noted that a lack of standing is not the
same as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.82 Finally, in Suster, the Court
stated that the decision whether a party has standing in an action is within
the province of the trial court.83 In other words, the discretion to determine
the presence of standing lies with the trial court, thus, unless the discretion is
abused, that decision should control.84
The Ohio Supreme Court refuses to follow its own precedent in
Suster in its holding in Schwartzwald in three ways: (1) by not allowing a
party to cure standing by substituting a real party in interest; (2) by
improperly equating a lack of standing to a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; and, (3) by ignoring the trial court's discretion in determining a
party's standing. 5
To further show the Ohio Supreme Court's abuse of the stare
decisis rule, a subsequent decision hailing from the Ohio Supreme Court
actually held the opposite of Schwartzwald and applied Suster, not equating
a lack subject matter jurisdiction to a lack of standing.8 6 In Groveport, the
Ohio Supreme Court cited Suster to make the point that a lack of standing
does not create a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, whether the
party can bring the action; the Court even cited to Schwartzwald in the next
paragraph! 7 It is worth noting that the holding in Groveport could mean
that Schwartzwald has been overruled and the Suster precedent has been
restored as binding with Groveport's adoption of it. However, the district
courts have not been applying it as such.88

Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1008.
82 Id. (citation omitted). To reiterate, the Court specifically stated that "[lack of standing
81

challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court." Id.
83 Id.
4 Id. (noting too, that jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal, but this author submits
that even if raised on appeal the trial court's decision as to standing should be strongly considered by the
appellate court).
979 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (Ohio 2012)
85 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald,
(arguing that because four justices did not join the Suster opinion and it was a mere plurality, Suster did
not constitute precedent to which they were bound to follow under the Ohio Constitution); see also
Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1008; CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 984 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)
(rationalizing Schwartzwald's refusal to follow Suster because the opinion was a plurality opinion rather
than a majority opinion and "'[a] majority of the [S]upreme [C]ourt shall be necessary to constitute a
quorum or to render a judgment' (quoting OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(A))). But see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supranote 16, at 1537 (defining stare decisis as "[tihe doctrine of precedent, under which
a court must follow earlierjudicialdecisions when the same points arise again in litigation") (emphasis
added).
88 Groveport Madison Local Sch. Bd. ofEduc. v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 998 N.E.2d 1132,
1139 (Ohio 2013).
87 Id. ("Lack of standing, on the other hand, challenges a party's capacity to bring an action, not the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal.") (citing Suster, 701 N.E.2d at 1008).
88 The Schwartzwald decision has been cited by over 192 cases as of the completion of this
Comment, and continues to be cited as authority. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. There is, on
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This demonstration of cherry-picking precedent, when it is
convenient, certainly bolsters the argument that the Ohio Supreme Court
was misguided in its decision in Schwartzwald. Had the Court not cherrypicked, but rather continued to follow precedent properly, the forthcoming
analysis of the implications, ramifications, and destroyed foundations of
ownership and civil procedure would be entirely unnecessary. Alas, the
Court did cherry-pick and create inconsistencies, thus the analysis is
necessary, and it is set forth below in Part III.
HI. ANALYSIS
The effects of the Schwartzwald decision are sweeping - spanning
from the mortgage lending industry as a whole, to individual lending
institutions, and from title insurance companies to individual bona fide
purchasers of previously foreclosed upon houses in Ohio. The decision also
has created application challenges for Ohio courts in its aftermath, but that is
beyond the scope of this Comment.8 9
Two major players in real estate, lending institutions and title

the other hand, an argument that Schwartzwald is still binding in a very limited context, and that
Groveport is binding for a broader context, but that is outside the scope of this Comment.
" CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 19.05[l] (discussing the way in which courts have
subsequently dealt with the Schwartzwald decision: "Other courts grappling with the afternath of
Schwartzwald have addressed its effect in varying circumstances. In Bank ofN. Y Mellon Trust Co., NA.
v. Shaffer, where the mortgagor did not produce the note with the complaint (but alleged ownership of
the note) and filed an assignment of the mortgage after the complaint was filed, a default judgment in
favor of the lender was overturned. In essence the court found that the plaintiff had not provided proof of
standing and its conclusory allegation that it owned the note was not sufficient, even though the judgment
rendered was by default. In IndyMac Bank FS.B. v. Borosh, standing to bring a foreclosure action was
challenged on the basis that Indymac was not assigned the mortgage until after it filed suit. However, the
court found that Schwartzwald did not apply, and held that, even if IndyMac lacked standing when it filed
the original complaint, such defect was cured by filing an amended complaint and attaching the
assignment of the mortgage prior to the borrowers filing a responsive pleading. In CitiMortgage,Inc. v.
Patterson, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the vacation of a foreclosure judgment where
the plaintiff alleged ownership of the note, and attached a copy of a note endorsed in blank, even though
the mortgage was not assigned until after the complaint was filed. The court pointed to language in
Schwartzwald to the effect that the plaintiff in that case had failed to establish an interest in the note or
the mortgage, therefore implying that an ownership interest in either document would be jurisdictionally
sufficient. Because in Pattersonthe plaintiff held the note, the Schwartzwald requirement was met. This
view was disputed by the Ninth District Court of Appeals in BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v.
McFerren. In that case, the plaintiff also produced a note endorsed in blank, but provided no evidence
that it was the holder of that note at the time the complaint was filed. It did, however, produce evidence
that it was the mortgagee at the time of filing the complaint. The Ninth District took the position that
jurisdiction requires ownership of both the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed.
The authors suggest that the better view may be as follows: an enforceable interest in the note is the key.
Under Ohio law, the collateral follows the note and the assignment of the mortgage is a formality.
However, as the Court pointed out in BAC Home Loans, ownership of the mortgage without the note is,
effectively, a nullity.") (footnotes omitted) (citing Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Shaffer, 981
N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 2013); Citi Mortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 986 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio 2013); Kernohan v.
Manss, 41 N.E. 258 (Ohio 1895); BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. McFerren, No. 26384, 2013 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3374 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2013); Indymac Bank F.S.B. v. Borosh, No. 98520, 2013
Ohio App. LEXIS 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013); Kuck v. Sommers, 100 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1950); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 (1997)).
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insurance companies, will be affected by the decision in several ways.90
Lending institutions, as a result of the decision, will have to restructure
certain mortgage lending practices. Title insurance companies will begin to
provide coverage with gaps, which may not be accepted by lenders and will,
therefore, devastate the industry of title insurance to the extent that those
gaps reduce the ability for title insurance companies to effectuate closings. 9
Bona fide purchasers for value will also experience a whole host of
issues, essentially to the extent of no longer being treated like bona fide
purchasers, with regard to property purchased both prior and subsequent to
Schwartzwald. These parties are particularly innocent because they were
not parties to the initial foreclosure action in any way. They neither
defaulted on their loans and failed to pay, as the foreclosed upon parties did,
nor did they fail to show assignment of the mortgage prior to filing an
action, as the lending institutions did.
From a social policy standpoint the effects are considerable as well.
The effects reach the courts to the extent that courts will have to deal with
more judicial inefficiencies as a result of redundant foreclosure actions,
which have previously been decided on the merits. Although to a lesser
extent, it affects the foreclosed upon parties themselves by providing them a
second bite at the apple, even though their actions have not changed, as a
result of the plaintiff being a nonholder prior to filing the action against
them.
Finally, the Court's decision in Schwartzwald should be changed by
reversing it entirely for noncompliance with Ohio law as it relates to
9 Levitin, supra note 2, at 645 (stating that what is at stake as a result of Schwartzwald-like
standing decisions is "potentially ruinous liability for the nation's largest financial institutions" and
"clarity of title to a large part of the real property in the United States").
"' See Russell Kutell, Will the Real Owner of This Mortgage Loan Please "Stand": The Necessary
Standingfor Ohio ForeclosureAction After Schwartzwald, FROST BROWN TODD: FIN. SERVS. BLOG
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://fbtbankingresource.com/The-Necessary-Standing-for-Ohio-Foreclosure-ActionsAfter-Schwartzwald ("The Schwartzwald decision will have a monumental impact on both the banking
and title insurance industry. As to the banking industry, it is a fairly common practice for lenders to
obtain assignments of notes and mortgages during the pendency of a foreclosure suit. At least in the
situation where the lender commencing the lawsuit does not yet have the assignment of the note and
mortgage, the lender should not commence an Ohio foreclosure action or should have the prior lender
commence the action and the new lender should substitute itself in for the prior lender as soon as the
assignment occurs. Otherwise, the foreclosure action will likely be dismissed and the new lender will
need to commence the action again. For the title industry, the ramifications of the Schwartzwald decision
are huge as well. Given that a lack of jurisdiction for lack of standing can make a judgment of
foreclosure and sale void, a title agent will need to ensure that the lender selling a property at a
foreclosure sa! was actually the owner of the note and mortgage when the foreclosure action was
commenced. If the lender was not the actual owner of the note and mortgage at the commencement of
the foreclosure sale, a title agent will likely take exception to that issue in any subsequent title insurance
policy. Similarly, if there was a foreclosure action involving a property in the chain of title, a title agent
will need to ensure that the prior lender who foreclosed on a mortgage and subsequently sold the property
in the chain of title was the holder of the note and mortgage when the lender commenced the foreclosure
action. If this is not the case, the title agent will likely take exception in any subsequently issued title
policy for that issue as well.").
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equating lack of standing with lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Alternatively, the decision should be distinguished as retroactive in
application to protect bona fide purchasers, as they are innocent parties
deserving of clarity of title.
A. The Schwartzwald decision affects the major industriesinvolved in and
party to foreclosure actions.
The decision affects two major players in home buying and
ownership - the mortgage lending industry and the title insurance industry.
The effects on the lending industry are primarily of the restructuring type.
Put another way, lenders will have to revise their approach to foreclosure
actions. Title insurance companies will be affected in primarily two ways,
both of which will extend to the bona fide purchasers. The ramifications for
these two industries will, in turn, create major issues that will detrimentally
impact bona fide purchasers of previously foreclosed upon homes, all
because the Schwartzwald Court got it wrong.
1. The Schwartzwald decision will require the mortgage lending industry92
to restructure its practices and will lead to an increase in problems, such as
bank walkaways.
More than 70,000 foreclosures were filed in Ohio in 2012 and
nearly the same number in 2011.93 After the housing market crash of
2008, 94 in 2009, there was a peak in foreclosures with 89,000 foreclosure
actions filed.95 Since 1995, the number of foreclosures has tripled in the
whole state of Ohio and quadrupled in fifty-one of Ohio's eighty-eight
counties.96
Just to put all of that into perspective, in 2012, "[t]here was one
foreclosure filing for every 73 housing units." 97 In fact, Ohio ranks as one
98
of the most troubled states in the country with regard to foreclosures.
These statistics may well be one of the reasons lenders have had trouble
filing their foreclosure complaints after assignment of mortgages and
promissory notes. With the sheer number of foreclosures in Ohio, it is a
wonder the lenders could keep up at all, if in fact they have. According to
92 NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 105 (noting that "[mlost home sales are financed with new

mortgage loans from institutional lenders such as banks, savings associations, and mortgage companies,"
which is primarily what this Comment refers to as the "lending industry" or "lending institutions,"
however there are other sources of lending to which this Comment may apply).
9 Home Insecurity 2013: Foreclosures and Housing in Ohio, POLICY MATrERS OHIO (May 9,
There were actually slightly more
2013), http://www.policymattersohio.org/foreclosures-may2Ol3.
foreclosures in 2011, specifically 71,556 foreclosures. Id.
4 See discussion supra Part II (E).
9 Home Insecurity 2013, supra note 93.
96 Id.
97 Id.
" Id. (citation omitted).
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Robert M. Curry and Professor James Geoffrey Durham, "in recent years
mortgage loans have been packaged and commoditized, assigned and
reassigned, as never before. The volume of transfers has led to incomplete
paperwork, unrecorded transfers, and other errors."9 9
As a result,
"[floreclosing lenders in many instances cleared up their records on the fly,
sometimes, as in Schwartzwald, after filing a foreclosure action."' ° This
issue of clearing records on the fly is not an acceptable one, but it shows
how flummoxed the state lenders were, and still are, concerning foreclosure
actions. The lenders were already in a scramble and the Schwartzwald
holding compounds, and even complicates that scramble.
Prior to Schwartzwald there was also an issue of lender walkaways
(commonly, bank walkaways) when dealing with foreclosures.'
As
described by Policy Matters Ohio:
The term "bank walkaway" is commonly used to describe
situations where the plaintiff gets a judgment from the court
but fails to execute on the judgment, leaving the property
unmarketable and with no owner. The former homeowner
is often under the assumption that the home title has
transferred to the lender or sold at auction, only to find later
that they are still listed as the legal owner of record. This
situation, often called a "toxic title" or "zombie loan,"
frustrates local communities because the properties sit
vacant and abandoned, largely unable to be sold or
rehabilitated. 2
These bank walkaways are likely to increase in frequency under
Schwartzwald because banks and other lenders are going to be required to
go back and refile their foreclosure actions in order to get proper standing as
a real party in interest and an enforceable foreclosure judgment. 3 This will
leave houses empty during the time it takes to refile and reforeclose the
same house with the same defaulting parties as defendants, which could lead
to vandalism, blight, drops in value, and so forth.
Further, it used to be a common lender practice to assign mortgages
or notes during the pendency of the foreclosure action and, as long as the
assignment was made prior to the judgment, courts accepted it. °4
Therefore, Freddie Mac had no reason to believe receiving assignment after
99 CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at §19.05[1].
100 Id. (emphasis added).
10! Home Insecurity2013, supra note 93.
102 Id.
103 See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ohio 2012).
104 Lasalle Bank Nat'l. Ass'n. v. Street, No. 08 CA 60, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1560, at *10-11
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2009); Wachovia Bank v. Cipriano, No. 09CA007, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS
1387, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2009); Bank of N.Y. v. Stuart, No. 06CA008953, 2007 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4605, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007).
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filing its complaint would be an issue that would cause their complaint to be
dismissed, based on the courts previous willingness to accept that. With
Schwartzwald now in play, the lenders will have to restructure this practice
so as to get the assignment prior to the filing of the complaint, which can
take time, leading to more potential lender walkaways in the end, providing
more expense for the lenders, and creating a potential increase in the already
massive urban blight problem in Ohio.
Consequently, Schwartzwald places a burden on the mortgage
lending industry to both relitigate past foreclosures and restructure their
practices for post-Schwartzwald foreclosures because it is not as though
mortgagors will miraculously produce the funds to pay the mortgage and it
is not as if mortgagors had not defaulted in the first place.
2. Title insurance companies used to have more inclusive insurance for
homebuyers, but in light of Schwartzwald, there will be gaps in coverage.
The number of title insurance policies issued in Ohio each year is
staggering to say the least. In 2013 alone, over $366 million dollars worth
of title insurance policies were issued, which is actually up from 2012's
numbers - over $323 million.0 5 According to Jeffrey Gammell, an attorney
and title insurance agency owner, who has been asked to testify as an expert
witness in Schwartzwald-type cases, the decision in Schwartzwald is a tough
10 6
one for the title insurance industry.
There are two types of title insurance - lender policies and owner
policies.'0 7
Title insurance is not required at every property sale,
particularly when it is a cash sale, and usually only lender policies are
required, as the lenders have great interest in protecting their risk."'
Owners are not protected by lender policies, however, and it is advisable
that owners get their own policy, yet not all owners do so, especially when
they are not informed that they should have the policy.0 9 Title insurance
15

OHIO

DEP'T.

OF

INS.,

2014

ANNUAL

REPORT

58

http://www.insuranec.ohio.gov/aboutodi/AR/Documents/2014AnnualReport.pdf;

(2014),

available

at

OHIO DEP'T. OF INS.,

2013 ANNUAL REPORT 68 (2013), available at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/aboutodi/AR/
Documents/2013 AnnualReport.pdf.
106 Interview with Jeffrey Gammell, Attorney-at-Law, Owner, M&M Title Co., in Dayton, Ohio
(Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Gammell Interview]; see also CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at
§ 19.051] ("Ohio title companies are concerned about titles involving foreclosed properties, and are
creating coverage exceptions.").
1"7 Gammell Interview, supra note 106; see also CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 19.0511];
All About Title Insurance:How to protect your realproperty against hidden risks, OHIO DEP'T. OF INS.,
1, 1-2 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), available at http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/eonsumer/
publications/Titlelns.pdf. "A title insurancepolicy is an indemnity contract in which the title insurance
company insures the owner of an interest in the described real estate against damage as set forth in the
policy. The principal forms are: an owner's policy insuring the owner of the fee simple title; a
mortgagee's policy insuring the holder of a mortgage on the premises; and a lessee's policy insuring the
owner of a leasehold interest in the premises." CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 6.03[l].
"' Gammell Interview, supra note 106.
109

Id.
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coverage is what is known as non-affirmative coverage, which means it only
covers unknown problems that are not found in a title search.' This means,
if a Schwartzwald issue is known to a purchaser or lender when the property
is purchased, title insurance will not cover it and the title insurance company
will now (and has already begun to) write it in as an exception.,I The result
of the exception is that any subsequent purchaser of a previously foreclosed
upon property - where the foreclosure was procured by a complainant
without standing or by an improperly substituted real party in interest - the
subsequent purchaser will be on the hook for any litigation resulting from
that defect in title. That exception will read as follows:
The Company will not insure against loss or damage and the
Company will not pay costs, attorneys fees or expenses that
arise by reason of the setting aside or attempt to set aside
any interest in the Land acquired under or subsequent to the
judicially ordered sale in (case caption and number) __
County Common Pleas Court, due to any claim of a lack of
standing or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in said
proceeding."'
The first issue regarding the effects on title insurance companies
emerges from the fact that title insurance companies, post-Schwartzwald, are
trending toward not insuring over Schwartzwald standing issues either in
owner or lender polices, which creates a gap in insurance coverage." 3
Lenders are trending toward not accepting insurance policies with this type
of gap, perpetuating the issue and creating a vicious cycle of unresolved
problems. 4 This creates a problem for title insurance companies in that
they cannot sell policies for foreclosed upon homes where there is an issue
of standing in the chain of title." 5 Further, this creates issues for bona fide
purchasers who go through the process of getting a contract on a property
and pay for the due diligence required, only to find that they cannot get a
loan because the lenders will not accept insurance with Schwartzwald gaps

"I NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 74 ("The title report does not necessarily claim to be a complete
statement of the findings of the company's search; technically, it merely states that the company is
willing to issue a policy insuring that the land's title is as stated in the report, and thus to be liable to
indemnify the insured if she or he suffers a loss due to any title defect not disclosed in the report."); see
also Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
"1
Gammell Interview, supra note 106. "A policy of title insurance obligates the title insurance
company to pay any loss, up to a fixed amount and as provided in the policy, that is suffered by the
insured because of defects in title or encumbrances existing at the date of the policy and not listed as
exceptions in the policy." CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 6.03[l]. In other words, exceptions are
items that the policy does not cover.
12
Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
11 NELSON ET AL., supra note 38, at 78 (explaining that insuring over means the title insurance
company will "refrain from showing the defect as an exception to the policy's coverage"); see also
Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
"4 Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
1t5

Id.
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from the title insurance companies)16
The other issue that arises for title insurance companies is the
problem with the pre-Schwartzwald polices, since the decision is
retroactive. 1 7
Although title insurance companies insured over the
Schwartzwald issues that may arise in pre-Schwartzwald polices, and the
bona fide purchasers with pre-Schwartzwald policies are largely protected,
the title insurance companies could and likely will come to bear the brunt of
any loss." 8 Underwriters for title insurance companies could end up with
costs falling back on them in the event that there is a Schwartzwald standing
issue that is challenged under a pre-Schwartzwaldpolicy either on a lender's
policy or on an owner's policy.1 9
With these two issues arising out of the decision in Schwartzwald,
and the sheer number of policies that are issued per year in Ohio, title
insurance companies will feel the impact from two directions - the preSchwartzwald polices and future polices that emerge post-Schwartzwald
with built-in exceptions that lenders are unlikely to accept.
B. The Schwartzwald decision will affect the chain of titleforpotentially
anyone who haspurchasedaforeclosure in Ohio or anyone who has
purchaseda home that has been previouslyforeclosed.
The biggest issue with the Schwartzwald decision is the way in
which it affects bona fide purchasers. For this reason, the decision did not
go far enough because it failed to distinguish between bona fide purchasers
that would be affected or protected by its holding and those that would not.
As a result, the Schwartzwald decision is devastating to bona fide purchasers
in three major ways: (1) even though a bona fide purchaser should have the
right to possession, they could be subjected to the cost of litigation in
fighting for good title, most likely through quiet title actions; (2) bona fide
116 See discussion infra Part II (B). As an example: "BFP" is the bona fide purchaser; "Lender" is
the lender that foreclosed on the property (the author will call it "Blackacre") without standing under
Schwartzwald; and "Title Agency" is the title agency insuring the property for both the BFP's bank and
the BFP. BFP begins negotiations to buy Blackacre from Lender. BFP gets preapproved from their bank
and waits the thirty days or more that it takes to get a contract ready on a property. BFP gets ready to
close and gets a phone call from Title Agent, or the BFP's bank more likely, saying that the Lender's title
insurance policy cannot be accepted because there is a gap in coverage due to Schwartzwald. BFP has
wasted time and probably some transactional costs in trying to secure Blackacre as their own.
Admittedly, they may not want the property anyway because it would leave them with a property that has
questionable title, but nonetheless their time is wasted. Furthermore, Blackacre now sits vacant - that is
until it is purchased by an all cash buyer or until it becomes an eyesore and the city tears it down. With
the number of properties Schwartzwald affects, this could be a massive problem economically,
particularly when factoring in current urban sprawl and blight issues.
17 See discussion supra Part I.
"s Gammell Interview, supra note 106; see also CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 6.01[4][b]
("Differences may emerge ... if a title insurer elects to assume the risk that a particular title defect will
not be asserted, and agrees to 'insure over' that defect, or if the insurer takes a more conservative view
and refuses to insure against a defect that a title examiner deems not to impair marketability.").
19 Gammell Interview, supra note 106.
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purchasers could go through the process of getting a contract on a property
and spend time and money for the due diligence required and then be forced
to walk away because title agencies are not insuring the Schwartzwald
standing issues, which most lenders probably would not accept, resulting in
a denial of the loan; and, (3) bona fide purchasers could become stuck with a
property - that was purchased pre-Schwartzwald- that is now unsellable.
1. Bona fide purchasers could be subjected to the cost of litigation in
fighting for good title. 2 '
Bona fide purchasers could be caused to litigate, at their expense, in
fighting for good title to a property that they purchased in good faith, or
third party acquirers could be caused to do the same after receiving property
in good faith. (For purposes of this discussion, the focus is on bona fide
purchasers.) The best way to illustrate the issue of forcing a bona fide
purchaser or third party acquirer to litigate for good title is by looking to a
trilogy of cases from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in which
Schwartzwald-like decisions did just that to third party purchasers in
Massachusetts.12
The Massachusetts equivalent to Schwartzwald is United States
Bank National Association v. Ibanez.122 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held in Ibanez, much like the Supreme Court of Ohio held in
Schwartzwald, that United States Bank (hereinafter U.S. Bank) and Wells
Fargo were not proper parties in their respective actions because they were
only future assignees of the mortgage
(and the note) at the time the
123
foreclosure complaints were filed.
Subsequently, in Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, another Massachusetts
case, Rodriguez's property was foreclosed upon by U.S. Bank prior to U.S.
Bank receiving an assignment of the mortgage from MERS. 124 Bevilacqua
came into possession of the property via a quitclaim deed from U.S. Bank
subsequent to the foreclosure judgment, and then filed an action to quiet title
against Rodriguez because MERS had not assigned the mortgage to U.S.
Bank prior to the foreclosure complaint and Bevilacqua believed this
120 It is true that the BFP's could go after the lenders (who sold the BFP's property they did not
own), but only if the deed the BFP's received was more than a quitclaim deed, that is either a limited
warranty deed that included coverage, or a general warranty deed. NELSON ET AL., supranote 38, at 19192 (explaining the difference between the types of deeds and the remedies that go with them).
121 See generally Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1131 (Mass. 2012); Bevilacqua v.
Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 898 (Mass. 2011); United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40,
54 (Mass. 2011). See also Levitin, supra note 2, at 640 (noting that the Court in Ibanez ruled "that a pair
of foreclosure sales was invalid because the foreclosing banks were not the mortgagees of record at the
time of the foreclosure sale").
122 Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53 ("[T]he foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the time of the
notice and sale in order accurately to identify itself as the present holder in the notice and in order to have
the authority to foreclose under the power of sale ... ").
123 Id. at 50-51, 55. Ibanez combined multiple cases into one decision. See id. at 44.
124 Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 888. MERS is the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. Id.
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constituted "a cloud on his title in the form of 'the possibility of an adverse
25
claim by Rodriguez against Bevilacqua's title to the [p]roperty."-1
The Court in Bevilacqua relied on the Massachusetts version of
Schwartzwald - United States Bank NationalAssociation v. Ibanez - finding
that Bevilacqua could not be the true owner because of the assignment issue
prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint against Rodriguez.1 26 The
complaint against Rodriguez vis-A-vis Bevilacqua was dismissed without
prejudice, however, but this would not cure the issue of the cost to litigate
for good title, in fact it would double the expense in making a third-party
purchaser litigate twice. 27 There is no discussion as to whether Bevilacqua
had actual or even constructive knowledge of the unassigned mortgage
problem prior to the quitclaim deed, but even if he did, this case is
illustrative of what can happen to a subsequent owner when there is a
standing issue in a foreclosure action within the chain of title.
Similarly, in Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held "that a foreclosure sale was
invalid because the foreclosing bank did not hold the promissory note at the
time of the sale. 128 Since the "Massachusetts trilogy[,]' ' 29 there has been
broad disagreement and confusion amongst the state and federal courts
130
across the United States over how to determine who has standing.
In light of the similarities between Schwartzwald and Ibanez (even
though they are from different states) and the subsequent decisions in
Bevilacqua and Eaton, the outlook is grim for bona fide purchasers or third
party acquirers in terms of getting good title, or title at all, through litigation,
even after the expense. The chain of title argument did not work for
Bevilacqua, and would not likely work for a bona fide purchaser in Ohio.'31
Furthermore, the cost of litigation will be borne by the bona fide purchaser
because of the exception that title insurance companies are writing and will
32
continue to write into their policies.
2. Bona fide purchasers could go through nearly the entire purchase process
only to have their loan denied for the reason that there are gaps in the title
insurance.
A second issue with the Schwartzwald decision as it relates to bona
fide purchasers is the issue it presents for homebuyers in the situation where
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.at 892-93.
Id.at 898.
Levitin, supranote 2, at 640 (citing Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1134 (Mass. 2012).
29 Levitin, supranote 2, at 642.
130 Id. at 644-45 (asking questions concerning the confusion such as: "Can mortgages be transferred
separately from promissory notes? What is the effect of unrecorded mortgage transfers?").
131Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 893.
132 See discussion supra Part III (A)(2).
125
126
127
128
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the homebuyers go through nearly the entire purchase process, which
requires a level of time and expense commitment, and then have their loan
denied because there are gaps in the lender's title insurance policy due to
title insurance companies' refusal to insure over Schwartzwald standing
issues.
When a loan is involved, the residential purchase and closing
process requires several steps. 133 There is first a pre-qualification in which
lenders gather information on potential borrowers to generate an idea about
whether they would be a good risk to lend to.' 34 Borrowers then compare
135
loan options by looking at rates and programs offered by various lenders.
Once a home has been chosen and the borrowers pre-qualify for a loan on
that property, the application process begins, following a processing of the
application, which requires the borrower to provide the lender with several
documents to prove ability and willingness to repay. 136 Once the loan makes
it through the underwriting and appraisal process, closing on the property
37
can begin. 1
This is the point in the process where the problem arises for bona
fide purchasers (the borrowers in this scenario). At this point, the lender
will become aware of any gaps in title insurance coverage, such as a
Schwartzwald exception.13 The lender then will either refuse to fund the
loan or it will not be approved. Either way, the result is that the bona fide
purchaser has wasted at least a month's worth of time in attempting to
purchase the property; that is only if the loan is a conventional mortgage for
a typical home as opposed to a foreclosure, short-sale, or FHA loans, and so
forth.'39 This hassle, the time and money wasted in getting nearly all the
way through the purchase process only to be turned away, is yet another
downside for bona fide purchasers who encounter a Schwartzwald issue.
3. Bona fide purchasers could be stuck with unsellable property that was
purchased pre-Schwartzwald.
Many homebuyers, especially those who do not purchase their
property through a lender, did not, in the past, traditionally purchase an
owner's policy from a title insurance company and as a result, they could
now have unsellable or difficult-to-sell property purchased pre-

'3

The Loan Process (Residential), MARIN MORTGAGE BANKERS, httpJ/www.marinloans.com/

loanprocess.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
' Id. (noting that there are two key factors lenders look to: "[flirst, the borrower's ability to repay
the loan and, second, the borrower's willingness to repay the loan").
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 id.
13' Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
139 The Loan Process,supra note 133; see also
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Schwartzwald 4 ° The difficulty that the Schwartzwald decision creates for
bona fide purchasers who have a Schwartzwald standing issue in the chain
of title of a property purchased prior to the Schwartzwald decision, is one of
real importance.
Many homebuyers who buy their homes with cash have no title
insurance at all and even some of those who do use lenders to fund the
purchase of their homes do not have owner's policies. 4 ' As a result of
Schwartzwald, their properties will become unsellable because the chain of
title is defective and sellers are charged with delivering marketable title to
the buyers.' 42 Ohio has even made the requirement of marketable title a
143
statutory requirement through the enactment of the Marketable Title Act.
Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined marketable title in McCarty v.
Lingham as:
[O]ne which imports such ownership as insures to the
owner the peaceable enjoyment and control of the land, as
against all others. It has also been defined as one which is
sufficient to support or defend an action of ejectment. It
should show a full and perfect right of possession in the
vendor. It should appear reasonably certain that the title
will not be called in question in the future, so as to subject
the purchaser to the hazard of litigation with reference
thereto.'44
Under the Ohio Supreme Court's own definition, a bona fide
purchaser pre-Schwartzwaldwith a defect in the chain of title as a result of
the decision in Schwartzwald, cannot sell their property and still provide
marketable title to the buyer because there would not be a reasonable
certainty that the title would not be called into question in the future. 145 In
fact, pre-Schwartzwaldpurchasers may not be able to present title at all, let
alone marketable title.
Since these pre-Schwartzwaldbona fide purchasers cannot present a
buyer with marketable title under Ohio's Marketable Title Act and McCarty
v. Lingham's definition from the Ohio Supreme Court, they will be left with
unsellable property until the Court fixes the decision in Schwartzwald. By
making the decision in Schwartzwald prospective in application only, the
"4 See discussion supra Part Ill (A)(2); see also Gammell Interview, supra note 106 (discussing that
traditionally purchasers in Cleveland and Columbus did buy owner's policies, but not in the Dayton or
Cincinnati areas; now, across Ohio, purchasers are increasingly purchasing owner's policies).
41 Gammell Interview, supranote 106.
142 See CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 6.01[1].
143 THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47 et. seq. (2014).
'"
McCarty v. Lingham, 146 N.E. 64, 66 (Ohio 1924); see also CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15,
at § 6.01[1] ("The purpose of a title examination is to determine the marketability of a title and the
presence of any liens or encumbrances against the title to the property.").
145 id.
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solution would be achieved. 146
C. The effects of the Schwartzwald decision extend to the courts and the
foreclosed upon partiesin a way that has some considerablesocialpolicy
impacts.
There are two significant social policy impacts as a result of
Schwartzwald, unrelated to the bona fide purchaser and the big industry
effects. First, through the decision, the Court created serious inefficiencies
for the courts themselves. The result is that courts will now have to rehear
the same foreclosure case that resulted in a foreclosure, subsequently voided
by Schwartzwald, in order to get a valid judgment. The evidence will not
change, and judicial resources and time are thus wasted. Second, the
foreclosed upon parties potentially get a second bite at the apple with a new
foreclosure action by filing quiet title actions themselves. The foreclosed
upon parties still defaulted, but they get a second chance, potentially many
years later.
1. The holding creates inefficiencies for the courts.
Courts, especially recently, have a strong policy against creating
judicial inefficiencies. Case law is wrought with rationales, which purport
that an alternate holding would create judicial inefficiency. 47 Two recent
and prime examples of the desire to reduce judicial inefficiency are Bell
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcrofi v. Jqbal, and through these
decisions, courts now have heightened pleading standards to avoid meritless
claims and clear dockets of those claims, speaking, of course, to the desire
to reduce judicial inefficiency.' 4 8
The Schwartzwald decision, although it is not a federal decision like
Twombly and Iqbal, goes counter to, in general, the judicial system's strong
149
policy against construing outcomes that create judicial inefficiencies.
Since the complaint in Schwartzwald was dismissed without prejudice, it
causes lenders, typically banks, to refile the same foreclosure action a
second time only to get the same result at potentially double the cost. 5 °
The first foreclosure action with a Schwartzwald issue will have
already been adjudicated on the merits as required by Twombly and Iqbal,
which the pleading standards in Ohio reflect, and the change in assigning the
mortgage and promissory note prior to filing the complaint does nothing to
"4 See discussion infra Part III (D)(2).

14' Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Att. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557

(2007).

14' Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case For Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to
Class Certification,43 AKRON L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2010).
'49 lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
ISo Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1223 (Ohio 2012).
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advance either side's position or change it in any way. 5 ' The same result
will then emerge in the second instance (or re-adjudication of the first
foreclosure action) because the defendants in the foreclosure actions already
had notice and opportunity to cure and also had the requisite hearings.
Consequently, courts will become muddled with duplicate
complaints taking up space on already brimming dockets. 152 In addition to
the duplicitous nature of this problem, the judicial inefficiency it creates
goes against the policy of the courts to adjudicate complaints on their merits.
2. The holding also disregards the fact that foreclosed upon parties are now
granted a "gift" for their failure to pay on a mortgage due to a lack of
standing, which does not change the default committed by the foreclosed
upon party.
Another problem with the Schwartzwald decision is the second bite
at the apple that it gives to the party in default in the initial action - the
foreclosed upon party. A case has already been decided in Ohio subsequent
to Schwartzwald where the foreclosed upon party, represented by the same
attorney as the Schwartzwalds, prevailed in her action against the bank that
originally foreclosed without standing, according to Schwartzwald'53 In
Washington Mutual Bank F.A. v. Wallace, the plaintiff (Washington Mutual
Bank, an assignee of the note post-complaint) successfully obtained a
default judgment against Betty Wallace (the original borrower and
foreclosed upon party) and nine months later Wallace filed "a 60(B) motion
to overturn the judgment."' 54 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed
the Twelfth District's decision overruling her motion, which "perhaps
impl[ies] that a tardy 60(B) motion [is] a permissible method for challenging
standing."' 55
Ultimately, because the foreclosure actions that lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under Schwartzwald's interpretation are void, the process
Betty Wallace went through might not even be necessary to achieve the
second bite at the apple. The second bite at the apple could be as easy as the
foreclosed upon party sticking a for sale sign in their yard and reaping the
benefits of sale as a result of the void foreclosure judgment, thereby
allowing the defaulting party to avoid the repercussions of default.
There are many counter-arguments concerning why many of the
51 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
152 Leach, supra note 13, at 1128 (concluding that "as courts hand down rulings that run contrary to

well-established legal principles, while simultaneously increasing litigation costs for all parties involved,

including the courts themselves").
... Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Wallace, 982 N.E.2d 691, 691 (Ohio 2012); see also Wash. Mut. Bank,
F.A. v. Wallace, 957 N.E.2d 92, 93 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), rev'd, 982 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 2012).
15 CURRY & DURHAM, supra note 15, at § 19.05[l] (citing Wallace, 957 N.E.2d at 94).
155 Id.; see also Wallace, 982 N.E.2d at 691.
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defaulting parties were victims in this whole scheme, but most of those
exceed the scope of this Comment. However, the counter-argument to
allowing the foreclosed upon party a second bite at the apple is a relevant
one with respect to some of the market crash and subprime mortgage crisis
issues discussed supra in Part 11 (E).
With regard to the issues of the recent housing market crash, some
of the parties that were eventually foreclosed upon had been maliciously
targeted by the lending industry.' 56 Ultimately, there were problems with
subprime lending, over-lending to unqualified buyers, and the banking
industry taking advantage of naive buyers by under-informing them and
relaxing standards used for qualification.' 57 As a result, some would argue
that the banking industry should go through all of the proper steps for filing
a complaint in a foreclosure action because they already had the upper hand
with many of these parties in the practices they utilized in lending to them in
the first place.'58
This argument, however, is both underinclusive and overinclusive.
Not all parties that are foreclosed upon were victims, in any sense of the
word, and not all lenders were taking advantage of the homebuyers that they
were lending to.' 59 As such, the defaulting parties are still granted a second
bite at the apple despite their default in the first instance, which presents a
policy issue that courts do not like to get into.
D. There are at least two alternativeholdings that would have made more
legal sense and had more limited and less drastic effects as it relates to
innocent thirdparties.
60
The Schwartzwald decision is wrong for the reasons stated supra.
As a result, the Court should alter its decision by reversing itself because the
issue of lack of standing should not be equated to subject matter jurisdiction
under Ohio law. Alternatively, if the decision is legally sound, it should be
distinguished because it did not go far enough in its holding, especially as it
relates to bona fide purchasers. Further, the Court failed to see the extent to
which bona fide purchasers are not going to be treated as bona fide
purchasers when there are foreclosures with Schwartzwald standing issues in
the chain of title.

56 See generally Jonathan Swift, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES
(November 22, 2011, 11:28AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/.
157 Id.

This author would submit that the Ohio Supreme Court in Schwartzwald ruled the way it did
largely based on this underlying policy - lenders should be required to go through all of the proper steps
because they were maliciously lending in the first place - but the Court did not include that in their
rationale for the holding, so this is merely speculation.
'5
Swift, supra note 156.
'6
See discussion supra Part 1I (A)-(C).
"'
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1. The decision to consider a lack of standing issue equal to a subject matter
jurisdiction issue is disputed by other Ohio decisions.
It is well established in Ohio that a lack of standing is not the same
or equal to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, making the Schwartzwald
decision legally incorrect, and largely under supported. The dissent by
Judge Diane V. Grendell in Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Shaffer
suggests that Schwartzwald is being misinterpreted as equating a lack
subject matter jurisdiction with a lack of standing. 6 1 If this is the case, then
the foreclosure judgments are not void, but voidable, as a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction creates a void judgment, but a lack of jurisdiction over
the case for reasons of standing creates a voidable judgment.'6 2 This would
clear up some of the issues discussed supra163 for bona fide purchasers, but
not those in which a foreclosed upon party filed a motion to vacate the
judgment as Betty Wallace did in Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v.
Wallace. 64
The entire issue of curing standing is where the real problem lies
with Schwartzwald, however, Ohio Civil Procedure Rule 17 suggests that
standing is not jurisdictional in nature, at least in as much as it allows for
substitution or joinder in order to bring in a real party in interest.165
Furthermore, the Schwartzwald Court failed to follow the doctrine of stare
decisis by failing to follow the precedent set forth in Suster and by cherrypicking when to apply that precedent. 66 Consequently, the decision is
incorrect under Ohio law and should be reversed.
2. Alternatively, if there is sufficient support in Ohio law for the decision as
it relates to standing and subject matter jurisdiction, the Court did not go far
enough in its decision, leaving bona fide purchasers in a position where they
are no longer treated as bona fide purchasers as it relates to foreclosure
purchases and the details relating to them.
In the alternative, there is some support for the Schwartzwald
decision in Ohio law discussed supra,167 and as a result the Ohio Supreme
Court could maintain the holding as to lack of standing being equal to lack
16'

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Shaffer, No. 201 1-G-3051, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS

3267, at *22 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 2013) (Grendell, J., dissenting), overruled by BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P. v. Meister, 2013-Ohio-873, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 765 (Ohio Ct. App., 11 th Dist.
2013), and overruled in part by Waterfall Vict. Master Fund v. Yeager, 2013-Ohio-3206, 2013 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3266 (Ohio Ct. App. 11 th Dist. 2013).
162 Id.
163 See discussion supra Part III (B)(l)-(3).
"6 See Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Wallace, 982 N.E.2d 691, 691 (Ohio 2012); see also Wash. Mut.
Bank, F.A. v. Wallace, 957 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), rev'd, 982 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 2012).
65 OHio R. CIV. P. 17(A).
166 See discussion supra Part II (B); see also State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002, 1008
(Ohio 1998).
167 See discussion supra Part III (A)(1).
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of subject matter jurisdiction, but should distinguish the holding to the
extent that it harms bona fide purchasers and should amend its decision to
the extent that it is retroactive, making it prospective only in application.
This would alleviate the issues title insurance companies face and would
allow time for the lending industry to amend its procedures for filing
foreclosure actions and assigning mortgages and promissory notes.
Furthermore, at the time Freddie Mac filed its complaint against the
Schwartzwalds, the practice of receiving assignment after filing the
complaint was commonplace as discussed supra.'68 Freddie Mac had no
reason to believe the late assignment, one month later, would defeat, without
prejudice, their claim. In other words, Freddie Mac did not have notice (at
least not in the Second District or in Greene County, even if the First and
Eighth Districts held otherwise), which is another reason the decision should
be prospective.
E. On the Horizon: Cases Coming Down the Pikefrom the Ohio Supreme
Court that Could Fix the Schwartzwald "Unforeclosure" Issue
The Ohio Supreme Court will have some opportunity to correct the
Schwartzwald problems in a few upcoming cases. The first case hails from
the Ninth District Court of Appeals for Ohio, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v
Horn.'69 The Ohio Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal in terms
of what depth of proof of standing needs to be shown at the time the
complaint is filed.' 70 Specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court will be resolving
a split between the Eighth and Tenth District Court of Appeals and the Ninth
District Court of Appeals. The Ninth District, in Horn, held that a bank did
not have standing at the time of the complaint because documentation of
proof was not attached to the complaint. 7 ' The Eighth and Tenth Districts
found the opposite, holding that documentation did not need to be attached
to the complaint, however, standing does need to exist at the time the
complaint is filed, just as Schwartzwald professes.' 72 Although this case
could give the Ohio Supreme Court room to correct the Schwartzwald
problems, the Finney case discussed below will have the most power for
that.

See discussion supra Part III (A)(1).
169See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn, No. 12CAO 10230, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2322, at *2-7
(Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2013); see also Matthew Moberg, Ohio Supreme Court to Address Issues
Arising in Schwartzwald's Wake, BANKING AND FINANCE LAW REPORT (April 25, 2014),
http://www.bankingandfinancelawreponrt.com/20 14/04/articles/collection-and-foreclosure/ohio-supremecourt-to-address-issues-arising-in-schwartzwalds-wake/.
170 Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Horn, 5 N.E.3d 668,668 (Ohio 2014).
1
Horn, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2322, at *6-7.
172 See Moberg, supra note 169 (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gray, No. 12AP-953, 2013 WL
3963471, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Najar, No. 985202, 2013
WL 1791372, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2013)).
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In Deutsche Bank Nat ' Trust Co. v. Finney, the Ohio Supreme
Court will answer whether a lack of standing deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction and whether a judgment where a plaintiff lacked standing
is void or voidable. 173 Ultimately, this decision will determine what happens
when a post-judgment challenge arises.174 "[T]he question becomes whether
the court had any jurisdiction to render a valid judgment when the plaintiff's
standing has not been affirmatively established. 175 With this question the
Ohio Supreme Court can correct Schwartzwald in a major way - in terms of
the effects that Schwartzwald has on bona fide purchasers. If the Ohio
Supreme Court determines that those judgments are voidable rather than
void then many of the issues with Schwartzwald will cease to exist.
However, there would still be issues with the Schwartzwald decision's
retroactive versus prospective application, which the Court most likely
would not address in either of these cases that are coming down the pike,
thus, there is still work to be done even if these cases start to correct and
undo Schwartzwald's unforeclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the effects of the Schwartzwald decision are so sweeping spanning from two of the most major industries in residential real estate to
the individual bona fide purchasers of previously foreclosed upon residential
property in Ohio - the Ohio Supreme Court must act. The Court needs to
reverse itself or distinguish this opinion in order to prevent the sweeping
effects on innocent parties. If the Court does not act, the decision stands as
inconsistent with the well-established law and precedent, and equity
considerations, which means the real estate industry in Ohio will have to
reorganize itself with regard to the newly created "unforeclosure" and the
implications, ramifications, and destroyed foundations it creates for
ownership and civil procedure.

...Deutsche Bank Nat'l
Trust Co. v. Finney, 5 N.E.3d 666, 666 (Ohio 2014); see also Deutsche
Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Finney, Nos. 13AP-198, 13AP-373, 2013 WL 5963079, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 5, 2013); Moberg, supra note 169. This case conflicts with a Tenth District Court case. See
Quantum Servicing Corp. v. Haugabrook, No. 26542, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3618, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2013).
114 Moberg, supra note 169.
175 Id.
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